Introduction
Article VI is perhaps the most ambiguous provision of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT or hereinafter 'the Treaty'). The provision requires all states parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
In spite of the resistance on the part of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the inclusion of a disarmament element in the NPT, 1 Article VI was eventually incorporated in the final text of the Treaty as a compromise between the NWS and the opposing positions of nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS). Together with non-proliferation and the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Article VI constitutes one of the three pillars of the NPT and is an essential element of the 'grand bargain' on which the Treaty is founded. 32. A commentator has suggested that, while the text seems to give more importance to the non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy pillars, a constitutional approach to the interpretation that takes into account the subsequent practice of the parties and the purposes of the treaty implies that equal weight should be given also to the disarmament pillar (N. 
Is Article VI of the NPT a Pactum de Negotiando or a Pactum de Contrahendo?
According to the ICJ's 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Article VI entails not only an obligation to negotiate but also an obligation to achieve a precise result -nuclear disarmament in all its aspects -by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith.
15
This conclusion, however, is difficult to reconcile with the ordinary meaning of the text, which does not suggest an obligation to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion, for instance, by adopting a treaty on nuclear disarmament -a result that is beyond the power of any individual state -but only "to pursue negotiations" in good faith. This is confirmed by an interpretation that takes account of the context, in particular, of the aspirational language of the preambular paragraph declaring the intention of the parties "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament." 16 The fact that Article VI does not entail an obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament does not mean that it has no normative value. Indeed, the provision contains, at the very least, an obligation "to proactively, diligently, sincerely, and consistently pursue good faith negotiations. [w]hether the obligation has been undertaken in good faith cannot be measured by the result obtained. Rather, the Court must consider whether the Parties conducted themselves in such a way that negotiations may be meaningful. 27 Finally, as Judge Owada recalled in his Dissenting Opinion in the Whaling in the Antarctic case, good faith on the part of a contracting state in performing its obligations under a treaty "has necessarily to be presumed," 28 although the presumption is subject to rebuttal.
Does Article VI Reflect Customary International Law?
Customary international law is created by the convergence of two elements: practice by a sufficiently representative number of states and other subjects of international law (for instance, international organizations) and "evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it" 29 (opinio iuris ac necessitatis).
Customary international law plays an important role in the Marshall Islands' applications before the ICJ, particularly in the cases against the NWS not parties to the NPT. Has Article VI become binding on all states even beyond the NPT? In his Declaration attached to the ICJ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, President Bedjaoui stated that it is not unreasonable to think that, considering the at least formal unanimity in this field, this twofold obligation to negotiate in good faith and achieve the desired result has now, 50 years on, acquired a customary character.
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With all due respect, it is difficult to agree with this view. The fact that a treaty has been almost universally ratified or that the states parties act in conformity with the terms of the treaty is not, on its own, sufficient evidence of its customary status. As stated in the Special Rapporteur's Second Report on the Identification of Customary International Law, one has rather to look at the practice and opinio iuris of the states that are not parties to the treaty and their attitude towards the treaty. 31 The practice of states that have not ratified the NPT (India, Pakistan and Israel) and of the state that has withdrawn from it (North Korea) appears unsupportive of the customary nature of Article VI. From a methodological perspective, one cannot see how such custom could be considered as formed without taking into account the (rather inconsistent) practice and opinio iuris of those states that possess nuclear weapons. The Special Rapporteur's Second Report on the Identification of Customary International Law explains that the practice of "States whose interests are specially affected" "should weigh heavily (to the extent that, in appropriate circumstances, it may prevent a rule from emerging)." 32 The specially affected states for the purposes of custom formation are in primis those that have the opportunity to engage in the relevant conduct. 33 While it is true that Article VI formally addresses all NPT states parties, this provision 'specially' affects only the NWS (at least with regard to the part of Article VI that refers to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament). Indeed, the NWS possess the weapons the elimination of which must be negotiated, and it would make little sense for the NNWS to negotiate nuclear disarmament without the participation of the NWS. The fact that Article VI consisted in what the NNWS asked of the NWS -together with the reaffirmation of the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right to receive assistance in the exercise of that right, in return for the NNWS' renunciation to acquire nuclear weapons -demonstrates that this provision was specifically aimed at the NWS. To be truly 'representative', therefore, participation in the practice must necessarily also include that of the NWS. In any case, the "formal unanimity" referred to by President Bedjaoui is not as solid as it may seem at first sight. Indeed, the position of the several NNWS that accept nuclear weapons on their territory and of those that benefit from the nuclear deterrence umbrella cannot be reconciled with the alleged customary nature of Article VI, as it is based on the acceptance that certain states may possess nuclear weapons. The fact that Article VI does not reflect customary international law has been confirmed in the ICJ's Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, where the Court states that the obligation "formally concerns the 182 states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or, in other words, the vast majority of the international community": the vast majority, but not the entire international community.
Conclusions
This chapter has argued that Article VI of the NPT only requires the states parties to pursue good faith negotiations in order to adopt effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear 32 Second Report, p. 36. 33 The mechanical transplantation of concepts derived from the law of state responsibility, like 'injured state', to custom formation should be avoided. It is also incorrect to argue that, because of the global effects of nuclear explosions, the interests of all states are specially affected: indeed, Art. VI does not deal with the use of nuclear weapons but with negotiations related to their possession.
arms race and nuclear disarmament as well as a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It does not obligate the parties to successfully conclude such negotiations by achieving an agreement. In order to be meaningful, however, the negotiations must be conducted in good faith with the aim of reaching this result. In this context, the upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference will offer an important opportunity for the NWS to show that they are committed to going in the right direction. This chapter has also maintained that Article VI has not yet acquired customary status, as there is no sufficiently widespread, consistent and representative practice and opinio iuris in that sense. This of course does not exclude that the provision may become a customary international law in the future, should the two elements of custom sediment.
There are of course many other problematic aspects of Article VI that, due to limited space, were not examined here. If any of the abovementioned cases brought by the Marshall Islands against the NWS for breach of Article VI reach the merits stage, however, the ICJ will have an unprecedented opportunity to clarify all the issues arising from what is one of the most controversial provisions of non-proliferation law.
